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COMMENT 
DESTINATION VENTURES, LTD. V. F.C.C. 
AND MOSER v. F.C.C.: HOW MUCH SHOULD 
THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION 
ACT RESTRICT YOUR PHONE, FAX AND 
COMPUTER? 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As new technology emerges, the appearance of 
related legal issues seems never to be far be-
hind .... 1 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Tele-
phone Consumer Protection Act2 (hereinafter "TCP A") in two 
February 1995 decisions: Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C. 3 
and Moser v. F.C.C. 4 Destination Ventures marked the first 
examination of the TCPA by any United States Court of Ap-
peals.5 In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that the TCPA ban 
1. Lutz Appellate Servo V. Curry, 859 F. Supp. 180, 181 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (re-
ferring to fax machine use prohibitions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act). 
2. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (Supp. V 1993). 
3. Destination Ventures, Ltd. V. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per 
Fletcher, J., joined by Nelson and Rymer, JJ.), affg 844 F. Supp. 632 (D. Or. 
1994). Plaintiffs did not appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court due to the high costs 
of continued litigation and because the TCPA provision restricting unsolicited 
faxing was not aggressively enforced by the Federal Communications Commission. 
See Kit R. Roane, Court Upholds Law Banning Unsolicited Fax Ads, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 24, 1995, at B6. 
4. Moser v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995) (opinion by Fletcher, J., 
joined by Nelson and Rymer, JJ.), rev'g 811 F. Supp. 541 (D. Or. 1992) (granting 
preliminary injunction), and rev'g 826 F. Supp. 360 (D. Or. 1993) (granting sum-
mary judgment and declaring the TCPA subsection unconstitutional), cert. denied, 
115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995). 
5. Andrea Gerlin, Business Tired of Faxed Ads Sue the Senders, THE WALL 
153 
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on unsolicited facsimile (hereinafter "fax") advertising was a 
constitutional regulation of commercial speech since the provi-
sion reasonably fit the government interest in preventing ad-
vertisement cost-shifting to the consumer.6 Five days later, in 
Moser, the same three-judge panel reversed a district court 
decision and upheld the TCPA's bar of prerecorded telephone 
sales messages.7 The Ninth Circuit held that automated 
telemarketing threatens residential privacy which justifies 
narrowly tailored statutory restrictions on such marketing 
methods.8 
This comment examines and attempts to reconcile these 
two Ninth Circuit decisions with prior Supreme Court holdings 
involving constitutional challenges to commercial speech regu-
lations.9 It concludes that both Destination Ventures and 
Moser are consistent with the Constitution and with the 
Congress' desire to avoid advertising cost-shifting.lo However, 
it suggests that the court exaggerated or overemphasized the 
harms caused by telemarketing and unsolicited fax advertising 
in upholding the corresponding regulations. ll Finally, it rec-
ommends· that the TePA be expanded to encompass other 
types of unsolicited faxing and to restrict advertising on the 
Internet. 12 
STREET JOURNAL, May 9, 1995, at Bl. See Lysaght v. New Jersey, 837 F. Supp. 
646, 647 (D. N.J. 1993) (The Oregon district court in Moser was the first federal 
court to review the TePA's constitutionality.). 
6. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55-56. 
7. Moser, 46 F.3d at 975. 
8. Id. 
9. See infra notes 84-142 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 147-73 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 174-220 and accompanying text. The Internet is an infor-
mation clearinghouse connecting millions of users worldwide through phone lines, 
modems, and computers. Kit R. Roane, Court Upholds Law Banning Unsolicited 
Fax Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1995, at B6. One computer expert estimates that 
today nearly 50 million users worldwide access the Internet on a regular basis. 
Stephen McGookin, FT Review of Business Books, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 27, 
1995. Most users access the Internet through commercial servers who charge set-
up and on-line fees in exchange for the use of host computers. See Aggi Raeder, 
Internet World 95: An Eyewitness Report, INFORMATION TODAY, May 1, 1995, at 57. 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss1/11
1996] TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. DESTINATION VENTURES, LTD. v. F.C.C. 
155 
Prior to the enactment of the TCPA, many travel agents, 
stockbrokers, and other small businesses promoted their enter-
prises through fax advertising. 13 Before the TCPA ban took 
effect, Destination Ventures, an Oregon company, used fax 
advertising to promote its training programs for travel 
agents.14 Other small businesses, including a paralegal ser-
vice (Lutz Paralegal Service), a fax number listing service 
(National Faxlist), an investment capital company (Porter 
Capital Corporation) and a travel agency (Lock Travel Service), 
also advertised in this manner.15 The TCPA prohibits any per-
son from sending unsolicited advertising by fax. 16 As a result, 
these five businesses, which desired to continue sending or 
receiving unsolicited faxes, challenged the constitutionality of 
the TCPA. 17 Specifically, they sought to enjoin the Federal 
Communication Commission (hereinafter "F.C.C.") from enforc-
ing the prohibition on using telephone facsimile machines to 
send unsolicited advertisements. IS 
In June 1993, plaintiffs filed suit in the Oregon federal 
district court claiming that the TCPA violated their "free 
speech and equal protection rights."19 The district court ana-
lyzed the constitutionality of the restriction to assure it reason-
ably fit a substantial government purpose.20 The court found 
the provision constitutional because it was narrowly tailored to 
13. See Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 54, 55 (9th Cir. 1995). 
14. [d. 
15. See Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 844 F. Supp. 632, 634 (D. Or. 
1994). 
16. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1993). 
17. Destination Ventures, 844 F. Supp. at 634. 
18. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1993). This subsection states in relevant 
part: "It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States ... to use 
any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited 
advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine." [d. 
"Unsolicited advertisement" includes material which "advertis[es] the com-
mercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is trans-
mitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission." 
[d. at § 227(a)( 4). 
19. Destination Ventures, 844 F. Supp. at 634. 
20. 1d. at 637-39. 
3
McConathy: Telephone Consumer Protection Act
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
156 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:153 
prevent the unfair shifting of advertising costs to the fax own-
er.21 According to the court, cost-shifting to consumers was an 
economic harm the TCPA sought to avoid.22 Thus, the district 
court granted the F.C.C.'s motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted.23 Destination Ven-
tures appealed the district court dismissal to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.24 
B. MOSER V. F.C.C. 
Unlike Destination Ventures, Kathryn Moser's 
telemarketing association utilized automated calling machines 
to solicit business.25 Moser used artificial or prerecorded voice 
messages to deliver advertisements and other information to 
residential telephone customers.26 Typically, these calls were 
conducted without the previous consent of the called party.27 
Moser and her telemarketing group challenged the consti-
tutionality of TCPA subsection which prohibits placing auto-
mated calls to private residences without the called party's 
consent.28 Plaintiffs claimed that this subsection restricted 
their First Amendment rights and sought to enjoin its enforce-
ment by the F.C.C.29 
21. 1d. at 640. 
22. 1d. at 636. 
23. 1d. at 640. 
24. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 54. 
25. Moser v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 970, 972 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 2615 (1995). Kathryn Moser served as president of a small trade group, the 
National Association of Telecomputer Operators (hereinafter "NATO"), which repre-
sented businesses using telecomputer marketing. 1d. at 973. Both Moser and 
NATO were named plaintiffs in the appeal. 1d. at 970. 
26. 1d. at 972. Some telemarketers use automatic dialer recorded message 
players or automated dialing and announcing devices to dial over 1,000 telephone 
numbers per day. S. REP. No. 178, 102d Cong., 1st. Sess. 2-3 (1991), reprinted in 
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat. 2395) 1968, 1970. 
27. See Moser v. F.C.C., 826 F. Supp. 360, 361 (D. Or. 1993). 
28. 1d. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1993). This subsection states, in 
part: "It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States ... (B) to 
initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or 
prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the 
called party .... " 1d. 
29. Moser v. F.C.C., 811 F. Supp. 541, 542 (D. Or. 1992). See generally U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech .... "). 
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Plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the District of Oregon seeking injunctive relief and a declarato-
ry judgment.3o In December 1992, the court temporarily en-
joined enforcement of the pertinent subsection until its consti-
tutionality could be determined.31 In May 1993, the court 
ruled that the TCPA provision unconstitutionally restricted 
protected commercial speech.,,32 The district court determined 
that the ban did not sufficiently advance the government's 
substantial interest in protecting residential privacy since 
automated calls constitute only a small percentage of all 
telemarketing.33 The court granted plaintiffs' motion for sum-
mary judgment and later declared the subsection unconstitu-
tiona1.34 The F.C.C. appealed the decision to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.35 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. DEFINING COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
The United States Supreme Court has defined commercial 
speech as any expression relating "solely to the economic inter-
ests of the speaker and its audience.,,36 Despite this ambigu-
ous definition, the Court has consistently been able to recog-
nize such speech.37 The Court stated that there is really a 
30. Moser, 811 F. Supp. at 542. 
31. [d. The Oregon District Court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary 
injunction on December 18, 1992 - just two days before the TCPA was to become 
effective. [d. at 546. See 47 U.S.C. § 227 (Supp. v 1993). The preliminary injunc-
tion enjoined the enforcement of the subsection until its constitutionality could be 
determined by the court. Moser, 811 F. Supp. at 545-46. 
32. Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 367. 
33. See id. at 366-67. Judge Redden cited congressional reports and a Roper 
Organization survey which found that automated calls make up ''less than three 
percent of the telemarketing calls received by Americans." [d. 
34. [d. 
35. Moser, 46 F.3d at 970. 
36. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n of New York, 
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (hereinafter "Virginia Pharmacy") 
(defining commercial speech as any communication which "proposes a commercial 
transaction"). 
37. See, e.g., Ohralik V. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) 
(defining attorney advertising as commercial speech subject to State Bar regula-
tion); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63 (defining public utility advertising as 
commercial speech); Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (defining prescription drug 
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"common-sense" distinction between speech "proposing a com-
mercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally sub-
ject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech. ,,38 
Courts have routinely held that commercial speech deserves 
some constitutional protection, but not to the levels warranted 
by political or non-commercial speech.39 If a communication 
advertises a product or service for profit or for a business pur-
pose, it constitutes commercial speech and is entitled to limited 
protection.40 
Fax advertising and automated telemarketing often dis-
seminate commercial information for business purposes.41 
Such sales methods typically promote products and encourage 
consumers to purchase goods or services.42 The First Amend-
ment protects these types of commercial speech, subject to 
limited governmental regulation.43 
B. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH PROTECTION 
1. The Traditional Approach 
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from abridging 
an individual's right to speak freely.44 Until recently, howev-
er, commercial speech was excluded from constitutional protec-
tion.45 The Supreme Court first articulated this traditional 
rule in Valentine v. Chrestensen,46 where an entrepreneur 
challenged a state law prohibiting public dissemination of 
advertising as commercial speech). 
38. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455·56. 
39. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. ("The Constitution therefore accords a 
lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed 
expression."). See, e.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456·57; Board of Trustees of the State 
Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989); Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748. 
40. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562·63. 
41. See S. REP. No. 178, 102d Cong., 1st. Sess. 2·3 (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat. 2395) 1968, 1970. See also H.R. REP. No. 317, 102d Cong., 
1st Sess. at 13·14 (1991), available in 1991 WL 245201. A call must "encourage a 
commercial transaction" to be subject to the TCPA. [d. 
42. [d. at 13. 
43. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 563. See also 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1971. 
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
45. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761·62. 
46. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
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advertising leaflets.47 The Court held that, although the leaf-
lets constituted "commercial speech," their distribution was a 
privilege which the government could "appropriately regu-
late ... in the public interest."4s 
This view changed, however, when the Supreme Court 
adopted a rule granting constitutional protection to commercial 
speech.49 The Court held that "purely commercial speech," 
such as prescription advertising, deserves some limited First 
Amendment protection. 50 The Court reasoned that the speech 
should be protected since consumers have a strong interest in 
the free flow of lawful and accurate commercial information.51 
2. The Central Hudson Test 
In the next decade, courts grappled with the limits of com-
mercial speech protection.52 Then, in Central Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n,53 the Supreme Court ar-
ticulated a four-part test to determine whether a commercial 
speech regulation violates the First Amendment.54 
In Central Hudson, a power company challenged a New 
York state statute banning all promotional advertising by 
47.Id. 
48. Id. at 54. 
49. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748. A pharmacy association challenged a 
state statute prohibiting the advertisement of prescription drug prices. Id. at 749-
50. The state pharmacy board claimed that the statute protected professional stan-
dards of the pharmacy trade. See id. at 751-52. The Court declared the law uncon-
stitutional, however, determining that "commercial advertising of the kind at issue" 
deserves some First Amendment protection. Id. at 779 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
50. Id. at 771, n.24 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973». The Supreme Court asserted that a state may not com-
pletely "inhibit the dissemination of concededly truthful information about lawful 
activity." Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771. 
51. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72. 
52. See, e.g., Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (invalidat-
ing town restriction on residential "For Sale" signs); Bates v. State Bar of Az., 433 
U.S. 350 (1977) (overturning state restriction on legal advertising in newspapers); 
Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding state restriction on commercial speech 
relating to illegal activity). 
53. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557. 
54. 1d. at 556. 
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public utilities.55 To determine the constitutionality of the 
commercial speech restriction, the Supreme Court applied four 
criteria: 1) the speech must not be misleading or concern un-
lawful activity, 2) the restriction must serve a substantial 
government interest, 3) the restriction must directly advance 
that government interest, and 4) the regulation must not be 
more extensive than necessary to advance the government 
interest. 56 
The Court determined that the utility advertisement in 
question was not misleading. 57 It also concluded that the reg-
ulation directly advanced a substantial government interest in 
conserving electricity.58 However, since the regulation banned 
all electricity advertising, the Court found it was more exten-
sive than necessary.59 Accordingly, the Court struck it down 
since the law failed the final portion of the four-part Central 
Hudson test.60 
The Supreme Court has held that when a commercial 
speech restriction is constitutionally challenged, it must with-
stand this Central Hudson "intermediate" level of scrutiny to 
be upheld.61 Courts examine such restrictions using a higher 
presumption of invalidity than the rational basis review used 
to test regulations of unprotected or misleading speech.62 Call-
ing this review mid-level scrutiny, courts apply a less stringent 
55. Id. at 558-59. 
56. Id. at 566. 
57. Id. at 567-68. 
58. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568-69. Utility advertising encourages consum-
ers to use electricity, directly opposing the substantial government interest to 
conserve power. Id. 
59. Id. at 570-71. 
60. Id. 
61. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (State ban on "direct, in-person, 
uninvited solicitation" by accountants is an unconstitutional restriction on commer-
cial speech); See also Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995) 
(Court upheld state law prohibiting lawyer solicitation of accident victims until 30 
days after accident.). Both cases applied the Central Hudson "intermediate" stan-
dard of review to test the corresponding commercial speech restrictions. Id. See 
Edenfield, 507 U.S. 761. 
62. See Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2380. See also Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 
at 761-62 (Commercial speech is entitled to some protection since it serves the 
economic interests of the speaker and helps disseminate useful information.). 
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test than the strict scrutiny used to examine protected speech 
regulations.63 
3. The Modern Commercial Speech Doctrine 
Since establishing the test for commercial speech in Cen-
tral Hudson, the Supreme Court has relaxed the "no more 
extensive than necessary" requirement.64 Mter closely exam-
ining the meaning of "necessary" in the test's fourth prong,65 
the Court determined that this term actually demands "some-
thing short of a least-restrictive-means standard."66 Rather, 
the Court requires only a "reasonable fit," or a "means narrow-
ly tailored to achieve the desired objective."67 As a result, 
courts now tolerate some degree of flexibility between the 
government's interest and the means chosen to accomplish that 
end.68 
More recently, in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 
Inc., the Supreme Court further clarified the fourth element of 
the commercial speech test.69 Applying a more lenient stan-
dard than the earlier "least-restrictive-means" requirement, 
the Court held that a commercial speech regulation need not 
be "absolutely the least severe [means] that will achieve the 
desired end.,,70 However, the Court added that the presence of 
"numerous and obvious less burdensome alternatives" was 
63. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562·63 (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456) ("The 
Constitution therefore accords lesser protection to commercial speech than to other 
constitutionally guaranteed expression."). 
64. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 
472, 480 (University policy prohibiting on-campus commercial solicitations, includ-
ing "Tupperware parties," need only be narrowly tailored to achieve a desired 
objective.). 
65. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
66. Fox, 492 U.S. at 476-77. The Court cited to McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), which interpreted the term "necessary." In McCulloch, 
the Marshall Court determined that "necessary" in the Necessary and Proper 
Clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8) did not mean "absolutely necessary" or "indispens-
able." See id. at 413. The Supreme Court in Fox agreed that the expression is 
sometimes used "loosely." Fox, 492 U.S. at 477. 
67. [d. at 480. 
68. See id. at 476-77. 
69. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416-17 nn.12-
13 (1993). 
70. [d. 
9
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relevant in analyzing the facts for a reasonable fit.71 Only one 
month after the Discovery Network decision, the Court inter-
preted the fourth prong further: a restriction "need only be 
tailored in a reasonable manner to serve a substantial state 
interest in order to survive First Amendment scrutiny.,,72 
C. THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
Although interstate commercial speech regulation became 
less restrictive following Virginia Pharmacy and Central Hud-
son, states continued to regulate this speech.73 By 1991, more 
than forty states and the District of Columbia had restricted or 
banned unsolicited automated calls and faxes within their 
boundaries.74 However, because states are constitutionally 
prohibited from restricting interstate commerce, state legisla-
tures have no authority to enact laws which could curb adver-
tising originating out-of-state.75 In response, states lobbied 
heavily for federal legislation to regulate these communications 
across state lines.76 
In 1991, Congress responded to the states by holding ex-
tensive hearings regarding interstate communication regula-
tions.77 Lawmakers determined that automated telemarketing 
calls constitute "an unwarranted intrusion upon privacy" and 
that unsolicited faxes unfairly shift advertising costs to the 
consumer.78 Additionally, Congress concluded that "junk" 
71. [d. 
72. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767. 
73. 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1970. 
74. 1d. Florida has attempted to regulate intrastate telemarketers by requiring 
them to maintain databases of individuals who wish to be excluded from 
telemarketing activities. See H.R. REP. NO. 317, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. at 9 (1991). 
Connecticut and Maryland have also enacted laws which prohibit the use of fac-
simile machines to disseminate unsolicited advertising within their state bound-
aries. In 1991, similar bills were pending in over half the states. 1d. at 26. 
75. 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1973. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 
U.S. 349, 356 (1951) (The mere existence of the federal commerce power restricts 
the states from discriminating against or unduly burdening interstate commerce.). 
See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
76. 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1970. 
77. See generally 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968. 
78. Hearing Before House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, 
102d Cong., 1st. Sess. 3-4 (1991). See H.R. REP. NO. 317, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 
25-26 (1991). 
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faxes engage machines for hours and can "thwart the receipt of 
legitimate and important messages.,,79 In response, the House 
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance determined 
that these communications pose a threat to privacy and should 
be curtailed by federal statute.so 
On December 20, 1991, Congress passed the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act which amended Title II of the Com-
munications Act of 1934. SI The TCPA, effective one year after 
its enactment, specifically prohibits sending unsolicited fax 
advertising or placing unauthorized automated calls.s2 Con-
gress assigned the implementation and enforcement of all 
TCPA provisions to the F.C.C.s3 
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. DESTINATION VENTURES, LTD. v. F. C. C. 
In Destination Ventures, the Ninth Circuit stated that 
constitutional issues are reviewed de novo.84 Accordingly, the 
court reconsidered all evidence and arguments submitted by 
the parties.s5 The court applied the commercial speech test 
developed by the United States Supreme Court in Central 
Hudson and its progeny: "[R]egulation of commercial speech 
must directly advance a substantial government interest in a 
manner that forms a "reasonable fit" with the interest."s6 The 
court stressed that the government has the burden to "demon-
strate the reasonable fit" with more than "speculation or con-
79. Id. The term "junk fax" refers to any fax received without the party's 
prior, expressed consent. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (Supp. V 1993). 
82. Id. at § 227(b)(1). Subsections (b)(3) and (c)(5) also permit a private indi-
vidual to sue the caller. Under these provisions, for each TCPA violation, a plain-
tiff is entitled to injunctive relief plus damages (actual monetary losses or $500 
per violation, whichever is greater). Id. at § 227(b)(3) and (c)(5). There is also a 
provision allowing for treble damages if the defendant is shown to have acted 
willfully or with knowledge of the prohibition. Id. at § 227(b)(3). 
83. Id. at § 227(b)(2). 
84. Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 54, 55 (9th Cir. 1995). 
85. Id. 
86. Id. (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n of 
New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New 
York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989». 
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jecture."87 In Destination Ventures, the court examined the 
governmental desire to prevent advertising cost-shifting in 
light of the First Amendment and upheld the TCPA as consti-
tutional. 88 
1. Substantial Government Interest 
In its decision, the Oregon district court held that the 
government has a substantial interest in protecting consumers 
from bearing the expense and inconvenience of fax advertis-
ing.89 The district court found that this interest stems from 
the general congressional objective to protect individuals from 
economic harm.90 
On appeal, Destination Ventures conceded that the govern-
ment has a substantial interest in preventing advertising costs 
from being shifted to consumers.9l Instead, it argued that the 
costs associated with fax transmissions were too minimal to 
justify regulation.92 Destination Ventures claimed that Con-
gress had unconstitutionally "singled out" fax advertising for 
regulation.93 Further, it argued that the TCPA provision 
should be struck down since the F.C.C. had not sustained its 
burden of demonstrating a "reasonable fit" between the ban 
and a government goal.94 However, the Ninth Circuit upheld 
the district court's decision that the costs shifted to consumers 
were substantial enough to warrant government regulation.95 
87. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55-56. The government must show that 
the hanns it seeks to curb are real and that the restriction "will in fact alleviate 
them to a material degree." Id. at 56. 
88. Id. at 54. The preliminary requirement of the Central Hudson and Fox 
commercial speech test is that the communication not be misleading or relate to 
unlawful activities. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. Although the Ninth Circuit 
did not seem to directly address this element in its analysis, it must have deter-
mined the faxes were not misleading since it proceeded with the other steps of the 
Central Hudson test. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 54. 
89. Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 844 F. Supp. 632, 637 (D. Or. 1994). 
90.Id. 
91. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56. 
92. See id. Destination Ventures argued that fax paper typically costs about 
2.5¢ per page, countering the F.C.C.'s estimate of 35¢ to 40¢ per page. Id. Both 
parties agreed that a single sheet transmission occupies a fax machine for between 
30 and 40 seconds. Id. 
93. [d. 
94. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56. 
95. See id. The district court previously determined that "unsolicited and un-
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2. Reasonable Fit 
In defending a statute's constitutionality with regard to 
free speech, the government must demonstrate that the federal 
regulation is reasonably fitted to serve a substantial govern-
ment interest.96 This fit must be supported by more than 
"mere speculation and conjecture.,,97 Destination Ventures 
argued that the government failed to meet its burden since it 
had not shown that unsolicited commercial faxes are more 
expensive than junk, prank, or political messages delivered by 
fax. 98 However, the Ninth Circuit held that the ban on fax 
advertising was reasonably fitted to advance the government 
goal of preventing cost-shifting because "unsolicited commer-
cial fax solicitations are responsible for the bulk of advertising 
cost-shifting.,,99 
The court also determined that the ban even-handedly 
applies to commercial solicitations sent by any organiza-
tion. loo As a result, it did not engage in any statutory over-
breadth or underinclusive analysis. lol 
While finding this "reasonable fit" between the TCP A 
provision and the government interest, the Ninth Circuit dis-
tinguished a similar case involving the distribution of commer-
cial handbills on public property.102 In City of Cincinnati v. 
wanted faxes can tie up a machine for hours and thwart the receipt of legitimate 
and important messages." Destination Ventures, 844 F. Supp. at 636. 
96. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480. 
97. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55. 
98. [d. at 56. 
99. [d. The Ninth Circuit implicitly affirmed that the TCPA subsection advanc-
es a significant government interest in a "direct and material" way as required by 
the Central Hudson test. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55. See also Desti-
nation Ventures, 844 F. Supp. at 637. The court recognized that, in order to be 
constitutional, a restriction must "in fact alleviate [a harm] to a material degree." 
Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55 (citing Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767). It also 
analyzed the other Central Hudson elements and upheld the provision, suggesting 
that the "direct advancement" requirement had been satisfied. [d. 
100. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56. The Ninth Circuit held . that the TCPA 
provision pertained to all commercial fax advertisements, whether by "a multina-
tional corporation or the Girl Scouts." [d. 
101. [d. 
102. [d. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416-17 
(1993) (The Supreme Court applied the Central Hudson·Fox four-part test to a city 
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Discovery Network, Inc., the Supreme Court struck down a city 
ordinance which banned handbill news racks but preserved 
sidewalk newspaper stands. l03 Although the city claimed its 
law reduced littering and enhanced sidewalk safety, the Court 
failed to find a reasonable fit since the ordinance only regulat-
ed a small part of the hann. l04 
Unlike handbill racks which plausibly increase littering, 
the fax advertising costs sought to be curbed in Destination 
Ventures accounted for a substantial percentage of all consum-
er cost-shifting. lOS The TCPA bans all unsolicited fax adver-
tising and greatly reduces the majority of cost-shifting to con-
sumers. l06 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that Congress 
could enact the TCPA to reduce the volume of intrusive calls 
even though their regulation would not completely abolish cost-
shifting. 107 
The Ninth Circuit detennined that a complete ban reason-
ably fit the government's interest. 108 This finding, coupled 
with the ban's evenhanded application, convinced the court 
that prohibiting unsolicited commercial faxes, regardless of 
their source, is a reasonable means of achieving the Congres-
sional goal of protecting the public from cost-shifting.109 
ordinance restricting certain newspaper stands, but failed to find a "reasonable 
fit."). 
103. [d. at 412; Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416-17. 
104. [d. The Supreme Court found no "reasonable fit" between the government 
interest in promoting safety & aesthetics and the ordinance because the "benefit to 
be derived from the removal of 62 news racks while about 1,500-2,000 remain in 
place" was "minute ... and paltry." [d. 
105. See H.R. REP. NO. 317, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1991), available in 1991 
WL 24520l. 
106. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 
1993). 
107. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56. See also United States v. Edge 
Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993). 
108. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56. 
109. [d. 
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3. Data on Cost-Shifting 
Destination Ventures argued that the TCPA ban was ex-
cessive.110 It admitted that fax advertising shifts costs to the 
consumer, but claimed these costs had been significantly re-
duced by technology and were now de minimis. 111 Both par-
ties used expert opinions and news articles to estimate the 
actual costs and burdens associated with fax transmis-
sions. 112 
The court refused to consider statistics to establish these 
costs, asserting that the district court had already given due 
weight to the parties' arguments. 113 The court held that Des-
tination Ventures could have challenged these "material facts" 
on appeal, but had waived this ability by not providing the 
F.C.C. with "reasonable notice that the sufficiency of its claim 
[would] be in issue .... "114 The Ninth Circuit refused to hear 
new factual data from either party and relied on the district 
court holding that the fax advertising cost-shifting was suffi-
cient to justify federal regulation. 115 Thus, the court held that 
the TCPA provision banning unsolicited fax advertising did not 
violate the First Amendment. 116 
110. [d. 
111. [d. 
112. [d. at 55-56. The parties agreed that a typical fax "ties up" a machine for 
between 30 to 45 seconds, but disagreed as to the cost of each transmission. [d. at 
56. 
113. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56. See Duggan v. International Ass'n of 
Machinists, 510 F.2d 1086, 1087 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975) 
(Flight engineer suing labor union was not entitled to extensive appellate review 
after the trial court had correctly dismissed the case on its merits.). 
114. [d. See Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 742 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(defining reasonable notice as "adequate time to develop the facts on which the 
litigant will depend to oppose summary judgment"). 
115. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56. 
116. [d. at 55-56. 
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B. MOSER V. F.C.C. 
1. Classifying the Provision's Content 
In Moser,117 the district court determined that the TCPA 
provision restricting automated telemarketing calls involved 
the regulation of commercial speech. us It then applied the 
Central Hudson and Fox tests to determine the constitutional-
ity of the statute. U9 The Ninth Circuit, however, determined 
that the TCPA subsection was actually a content-neutral regu-
lation since the statute regulates both commercial and non-
commercial telemarketing calls. 120 As a result, the Ninth Cir-
cuit applied a different test of constitutionality than the dis-
trict court. 121 
2. The Ward Test as Applied to TCPA Subsection (b)(l)(B) 
The Ninth Circuit explained that, under Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism,122 for a government restriction on the time, 
place, and manner of content-neutral speech to be constitution-
al, the regulation must be: (1) narrowly tailored to advance a 
significant government interest, (2) adequately justified with-
out reference to the content of the speech, and (3) must leave 
open alternate channels for communication of the informa-
tion. 123 The Ninth Circuit noted that the constitutional tests 
117. Moser v. F.C.C., 811 F. Supp 541 (D. Or. 1992) (granting preliminary in-
junction). 
118. [d. at 543. The district court determined that 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) is a 
"content-based regulation" since it draws distinctions between recorded and live 
speech and distinguishes between commercial and non-commercial messages. Moser 
v. F.C.C., 826 F. Supp. 360, 363. (D. Or. 1993). Citing Discovery Network, the 
district court determined the constitutionality of the provision should be examined 
using the Central Hudson and Fox commercial speech tests. [d. at 364. 
119. [d. at 363-64. 
120. Moser v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 
2615 (1995). The Ninth Circuit found that "since nothing in the statute requires 
the Commission to distinguish between commercial and non-commercial speech . . . 
[it] should be analyzed as a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction." [d. 
121. See id. See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (outlin-
ing constitutional test for content-neutral speech). 
122. [d. 
123. Moser, 46 F.3d at 973. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. The Court upheld a 
New York City law requiring rock performers in public parks to use city provided 
sound equipment and technicians in an effort to reduce concert noise. [d. at 787. 
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for restrictions on content-neutral time, place, and manner 
speech and commercial speech are "essentially identical. "124 
a. Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government 
Interest 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Congress that protecting 
residential privacy from automated telemarketing calls is a 
substantial government interest. 125 The court referred to con-
gressional findings that such calls constituted an "invasion of 
privacy" and that consumers favored their regulation. 126 The 
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and determined that 
the TCPA restriction was "narrowly tailored" to serve this 
significant government interest. 127 In upholding the provi-
sion, the Ninth Circuit relied on recent Supreme Court deci-
sions holding that proper commercial speech regulations must 
be narrowly tailored, but need not be the least restrictive 
means available. 128 
b. Adequately Justified Without Reference to Content 
The plaintiff in Moser argued that no justification for the 
TCPA ban on automated, commercial calls exists since such 
calls are no more intrusive than "live" or non-commercial 
ones. 129 However, the Ninth Circuit adopted the findings of 
The Court sustained the law as a valid time, place, or manner restriction even 
though less-restrictive means existed to keep sounds low. [d. at 802-03. 
124. Moser, 46 F.3d at 973 (citing Fox, 492 U.S. at 477). 
125. See id. at 974. See also Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 362 ("[TJhe government's 
interest in promoting residential privacy . . . is substantial."). 
126. [d. See S. REP. NO. 178, 102d Cong., 1st. Sess. 2-3 (1991), reprinted in 
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (l05 Stat. 2395) 1968, 1969, 1972-73. 
127. Moser, 46 F.3d at 975. The district court previously determined that the 
ban was not "reasonably fitted" to advance the government interest given the 
ban's slight benefit, the narrow distinction between automated calls and other 
types of telephonic solicitations, and the government's disregard for less burden-
some alternatives. Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 365. However, the Ninth Circuit dis-
agreed. See Moser, 46 F.3d at 974. 
128. [d. at 973-74. See, e.g., Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410; Clark v. Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
129. Moser, 46 F.3d at 974. In the district court, Moser argued that the ban 
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congressional hearings which identified automated 
telemarketing as a residential privacy threat. 130 The court 
gave deference to the conclusions since Congress is ''better 
equipped [than the court] to amass and evaluate the vast 
amounts of data bearing on such an issue.,,131 Accordingly, 
the court held that congressional and public concerns sur-
rounding residential privacy justified the narrowly tailored 
TCPA ban on automated, commercial calls. 132 
The Ninth Circuit court also determined that the regula-
tion does not violate the constitution since it does not favor a 
particular viewpoint. 133 The court explained that such 
underinclusive speech regulation is acceptable so long as it 
does not give "one side of a debatable question an advantage in 
expressing its views to the people.,,134 Consequently, it held 
that the ban on automated, prerecorded calls did not seek to 
"favor a particular viewpoint" and was within acceptable con-
stitutional limits on free speech. 135 
The court emphasized that the government is not required 
to "make progress on every front before it can make progress 
on any front."136 Thus, the harm sought to be curtailed by the 
government need only be substantially reduced, not totally 
eliminated.137 For example, the government could sufficiently 
reduce the harm of telemarketing by regulating only automat-
would not significantly advance the government interest since automated calls 
represent only a fraction of all telemarketing calls. Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 367. 
The district court agreed with Moser's position, relying on the ban's "slight" bene-
fit to find no "reasonable fit." [d. 
130. Moser, 46 F.3d at 974. The court referred to the findings of Senate Report 
No. 102-178. [d. See 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1970. 
131. Moser, 46 F.3d at 974 (citing Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survi-
vors, 473 U.S. 305, 330-31 n.12 (1985)). The Ninth Circuit noted that reliance on 
the reports would not "foreclose the court's independent judgment." [d. 
132. See id. at 974-75. The Ninth Circuit held the TCPA provision to be con-
tent-neutral since "nothing in the statute requires the Commission to distinguish 
between commercial and non-commercial speech." [d. at 973. 
133. [d. at 974. 
134. [d. (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2043 (1994) (an 
"underinc1usive" speech regulation is only unconstitutional if it gives a particular 
group an advantage in expressing its views». 
135. Moser, 46 F.3d at 974. 
136. See id. (quoting Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2707). 
137. [d. 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss1/11
1996] TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 171 
ed telemarketing, without banning all phone solicitations.13s 
Therefore, the TCPA can constitutionally restrict only auto-
mated calls while still exempting "live," non-commercial, or 
operator introduced ones from regulation. 139 
c. Alternative Channels Available 
The Ninth Circuit determined that the TCPA properly 
excluded alternative channels of communication from regula-
tion, including taped messages, operator introduced recorded 
calls, and direct "live" solicitations.14O The court held that al-
though automated solicitations are the least expensive and 
most efficient method of telemarketing, they could still be 
restricted by Congress. 141 
The Ninth Circuit held that the TCPA provision did not 
violate the First Amendment since Congress narrowly tailored 
the Act to promote residential privacy and preserved unregu-
lated alternative methods of disseminating this informa-
tion. 142 
138. Moser, 46 F.3d at 975. 
139. See id. at 974-75. 
140. See id. The TCPA regulates calls placed by an automated dialing system, 
using an artificial or prerecorded voice, or unsolicited advertisements sent by fax 
or computer. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993). See also 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1968 (The primary focus of the TCPA is to "protect the public from automated 
telephone calls."). 
141. Moser, 46 F.3d at 975. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949) 
(The Court upheld a city ban on sound trucks based on the municipal desire to 
protect "quiet and tranquility." The Court reasoned that although "more people 
may be easily reached by sound trucks ... [this] is not enough to call forth con-
stitutional protection for what those charged with public welfare reasonably think 
is a nuisance when easy means of publicity are open."). 
142. Moser, 46 F.3d at 975. On appeal, the F.C.C. also challenged the district 
court's jurisdiction over the case, arguing that the Court of Appeals has exclusive 
jurisdiction over F.C.C. regulatory challenges. [d. at 973 (referring to 47 U.S.C. § 
402(a) (Supp. V 1993)). The Ninth Circuit declined to grant exclusive jurisdiction. 
[d. The court reasoned that since the TCPA provision was part of the initial stat-
ute and not a subsequent F.C.C. regulation, the district court had initial federal 
question jurisdiction. [d. 
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V. CRITIQUE 
In both Destination Ventures l43 and Moser,l44 the same 
unanimous three judge panel upheld TCPA provisions restrict-
ing automated telemarketing and unsolicited fax advertising. 
These decisions are consistent with the Constitution and with 
Congress' articulated desire to reform telemarketing and avoid 
advertising cost-shifting. 145 However, in deciding these cases, 
the Ninth Circuit failed to thoroughly address valid arguments 
offered by both plaintiffs. 146 
A. No "REASONABLE FIT" IN DESTINATION VENTURES 
In Destination Ventures, the Ninth Circuit applied the 
Central Hudson test for constitutional commercial speech and 
held that the TCPA fax restriction "reasonably fit" the substan-
tial government interest of preventing cost-shifting.147 How-
ever, the opinion failed to fully analyze plaintiff's argument 
that a complete ban of all unsolicited faxes is more extensive 
than necessary. 148 
The Supreme Court interpreted Central Hudson to require 
less than a perfect fit, but at least a reasonable fit "between 
the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish 
those ends.'1149 The Court also held that the existence of "nu-
merous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives" is relevant 
in analyzing a commercial speech restriction. 150 
Destination Ventures argued that many other less-burden-
143. Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995). 
144. Moser v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 
(1995). 
145. See S. REP. NO. 178, 102d Cong., 1st. Sess. 2-3 (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat. 2395) 1968, 1969-70. See also H.R. REp. NO. 317, 102d 
Cong., 1st Sess. at 13-14 (1991), available in 1991 WL 245201. 
146. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d 54; Moser, 46 F.3d at 970. 
147. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55, 57. 
148. See id. 
149. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 
480 (1989). 
150. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 
(1993). 
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some alternatives to a total ban on unsolicited fax advertising 
exist, including: using "do-not-fax" lists, regulating the hours of 
fax advertising, and limiting the frequency of transmis-
sions.15l The district court held that these alternatives failed 
to establish that Congress had improperly tailored the TCPA 
to prevent cost-shifting.152 
The Ninth Circuit opinion offered no discussion regarding 
other methods to reduce fax advertising costS.153 Neverthe-
less, plaintiffs proposed techniques, and others such as the use 
of a toll-free number to request reimbursement or a similar 
"hotline" to permit fax owners to be excluded from future 
transmissions, might have proved less restrictive. l54 Because 
less-burdensome alternatives would have been relevant, the 
court should have considered whether any means other than a 
complete ban would have advanced the governmental interest 
"in a manner less intrusive to [plaintiffs] First Amendment 
rights. ,,155 
B. No SIGNIFICANT HARM 
In Moser, plaintiffs argued that the TCPA's content-neu-
tral ban on automated telemarketing calls was underinclusive 
since it excluded all other types of telemarketing from regula-
tion. ls6 However, the Ninth Circuit held that since "the ban 
on automated, prerecorded calls [was] not an attempt to favor 
a particular viewpoint," it was constitutional. 157 
Nearly 70 percent of the American public regard calls from 
151. See Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 844 F. Supp. 632, 639 (D. Or. 
1994). See also Daniel Brenner, Federal Court Decision: a Roadblock to Advertising 
on the Information Highway?, 5 WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION (LEGAL OPINION 
LETTER) NO. 12 (June 9, 1995) (hereinafter "BRENNER"). 
152. Destination Ventures, 844 F. Supp. at 639. 
153. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 54. 
154. See BRENNER, supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
155. Id. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1593-94 (1995). The 
court struck down a federal law prohibiting the display of alcohol content percent-
ages on beer labels. In its analysis, the Court examined alternatives to the ban 
such as directly limiting alcohol content, prohibiting marketing efforts of high 
alcohol products, and limiting the ban to only certain types of beer. Id. at 1593. 
156. See Moser, 46 F.3d at 974. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1993). 
157. Moser, 46 F.3d at 974-75. 
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automated telemarketers as "annoying" and an intrusion into 
the home. l58 Yet, automated solicitations make up "less than 
three percent of all telemarketing calls received by Ameri-
cans.,,159 As the Oregon district court determined, the TCPA 
ban on automated calls would eliminate only a very small 
percentage of the millions of sales calls made each day.l60 
In Discovery Network, the Supreme Court held that the 
prohibition of only a small number of newsracks did not rea-
sonably fit the advancement of the state's interest in prevent-
ing littering.161 However, in Moser, the Ninth Circuit upheld 
the TCPA ban on automated sales calls, even though these 
calls made up only a small percentage of all telemarketing.162 
As the Supreme Court noted, ''bright lines that clearly 
cabin commercial speech in a distinct category" are difficult to 
draw. 163 However, in this case, it appears that prohibiting au-
tomated calls, which constitute only part of the total harm 
caused by telemarketing, is underinclusive. l64 Under its test 
for content-neutral speech, the Ninth Circuit should have more 
closely examined whether automated telemarketing actually 
constitutes a significant harm which justifies regulation. 165 
C. DIMINISHING FAX COSTS 
In Destination Ventures, plaintiffs argued that the cost-
shifting resulting from fax advertising had become very small 
due to modern technological advances. 166 However, the Ninth 
158. Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 366 (referring to a Roper Organization survey). See 
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1972 ("[AJrtificial or prerecorded voice messages are more of 
a nuisance and a greater invasion of privacy than calls placed by 'live' persons."). 
159. Moser, 826 F. Supp. at 366-67. 
160. [d. at 367. 
161. See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 425-26; supra notes 102-04 and accom-
panying text. The challenged regulation banned 62 racks, accounting for only about 
3-4% of all racks in the city. [d. at 1510. 
162. Moser, 46 F.3d at 974-75. 
163. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 419. 
164. See generally Moser, 46 F.3d at 973-75. 
165. [d. See, e.g., supra note 122-23 and accompanying text (outlining three part 
constitutionality test for content-neutral commercial speech regulations). 
166. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56. On appeal, both Destination Ven-
tures and the F.C.C. introduced declarations estimating the costs of a typical fax. 
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Circuit chose to examine the harm caused by unsolicited faxes 
"as it existed when Congress enacted the [TCPA], rather than 
speculate upon what solutions may turn up in the future."167 
The court, relying on 1991 congressional findings, concluded 
that unwanted faxes cause cost-shifting and inconvenience 
sufficient to warrant their regulation. 168 
Although courts often give deference to legislative conclu-
sions, such findings do not foreclose the court's independent 
judgment.169 The Supreme Court held that "reliance on legis-
lative history is hazardous at best.'ll7O Accordingly, the Ninth 
Circuit may have given too much weight to the outdated find-
ings of Congress regarding the TCP A. 171 
Since the Act's enactment in December 1991, advances in 
technology have nearly eliminated the costs and inconvenience 
of unsolicited faxes. 172 Although an advertiser may not im-
pose its costs upon the consumer, it appears that inconve-
nience or de minimis cost shifting is acceptable under the Con-
stitution. 173 The court should have considered this movement 
towards nominal cost faxing further before categorizing facsim-
[d. 
167. [d. at 57. "[T]he possibility of future technological advances allowing simul-
taneous transmissions and eliminating the need for paper does not alter this con-
clusion." [d. 
168. See id.; Destination Ventures, 844 F. Supp. at 636-37. See also Walters v. 
National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 331 n.12 (1985) (Congress is 
"better equipped to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing on such 
issue[s)."); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 72-73, 83 (1985) (Court upheld male-
only military draft after deferring to prior Congressional findings.). 
169. See Sable Communications v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989). See also 
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978) ("Deference 
to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights 
are at stake."). 
170. Board of Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 242 
(1990). 
171. See generally Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55. See also 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968 (findings were published in November, 1991). 
172. See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text. 
173. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983). The Court 
struck down a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited advertisements 
for contraceptives. The court held that a "short, though regular journey from the 
mailbox to the trashcan . . . is an acceptable burden, at least as far as the Con-
stitution is concerned." [d. 
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ile advertising cost-shifting as a substantial interest the gov-
ernment should avoid. 174 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Currently, the TCPA does not preclude the transmission of 
non-commercial faxes, such as political messages or prank 
faxes, to unconsenting recipients. 175 In addition, the TCPA 
does not regulate the transmission of commercial or non-com-
mercial messages to unconsenting Internet users. 176 Like un-
solicited fax advertising and automated telemarketing, these 
unregulated categories also shift transmission costs and incon-
venience to the consumer. 177 
Pursuant to the TCPA, the F.C.C. can initiate rulemaking 
proceedings and promulgate regulations to protect the privacy 
rights of telephone subscribers in an "efficient, effective, and 
economic manner."178 However, since its regulatory power is 
limited by the language of the Act, the F.C.C. is powerless to 
restrict these unarticulated channels of communication. 179 
In both Destination Ventures and Moser, the Ninth Circuit 
opted to follow outdated congressional findings and upheld 
portions of the TCP A. 180 If the courts are going to examine 
the TCPA's constitutionality based upon conditions existing at 
174. See generally Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 57. 
175. See generally Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d at 54, 55 (9th 
Cir. 1995). See also 47 U.S.C. § 227 (Supp. V 1993). 
176. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1993). The statute only prohibits 
using a "computer, or other device" to send an unwanted commercial message to a 
fax machine. [d. 
177. See generally Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56. Plaintiffs argued that 
both commercial and non-commercial faxes tie up machines equally and require 
the recipient to pay ink and paper costs. [d. 
178. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1-2) (Supp. V 1993). "The Commission 
shall . . . prescribe regulations to implement methods and procedures for protect-
ing the privacy rights described . . . in an efficient, effective, and economic man-
ner and without the imposition of any additional charges to telephone subscribers." 
[d. 
179. See id. 
180. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 57; Moser v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 970, 
974-75 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995). 
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its enactment, then Congress should regularly amend the 
TCPA to account for changing technology.l81 
A. THE TCPA SHOULD BAN ALL UNSOLICITED FAXING 
Currently, the TCPA prohibits unsolicited advertisements 
sent from a facsimile machine or computer to another facsimile 
machine. 182 Under this law, courts have assessed compensa-
tory and punitive damages against defendants who illegally 
transmit advertising in such a fashion. 183 
However, the TCPA only restricts messages advertising 
the commercial availability of products or services. l84 The 
statute is silent regarding unsolicited non-commercial messag-
es such as political propaganda, fund-raising appeals from non-
profit groups, prank faxes, vulgar cartoons, and other trans-
missions. 185 As the plaintiffs in Destination Ventures argued, 
faxes which contain advertising are no more costly to the un-
willing recipient than faxes containing non-commercial mes-
sages. l86 Unfortunately, because Congress considered only 
faxes which solicit the sale of products or services during its 
1991 TCPA hearings, the resulting statute regulates only com-
mercial faxes. 187 
Fax technology has steadily advanced since the TCPA's 
enactment. l88 Modern fax machines and modems "brand" 
each page of outgoing transmissions with the sender's name 
and telephone number. 189 Additionally, faxes now can be 
181. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 57. 
182. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1993). 
183. See Andrea Gerlin, Business Tired of Faxed Ads Sue the Senders, THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 9, 1995, at B1. A group of Texas businesses sued 35 
companies alleging that unwanted ads tie up fax machines, use ink & paper, con-
stitute a nuisance, and invade their privacy. In 1994 alone, the F.C.C. received 
over 300 official complaints from recipients of unwanted fax advertisements. Id. 
184. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) and (a)(4). 
185. Id. 
186. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56. 
187. See H.R. REP. No. 317, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1991), available in 1991 
WL 245201. 
188. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 57. 
189. Telephony, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Aug. 31, 1995, at 1. See 47 U.S.C. § 
227(d)(2) (Supp. V 1993). 
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transmitted and received completely by computer, allowing 
users to preview and store messages prior to printout. 190 
Some new machines even include an "anti-junk-mail feature" 
to block incoming transmissions which do not originate from a 
pre-entered list of phone numbers. 191 
Despite these technological advances, complaints involving 
unsolicited, non-commercial faxes continue to increase. 192 
Since both commercial and non-commercial transmissions 
harm an unwilling recipient equally, the TCPA should prohibit 
all unsolicited faxes regardless of their content.193 Any argu-
ment that such a broad ban would chill speech could be cir-
cumvented by revising the Act's definition of unsolicited adver-
tisement to require the consent of the receiving party.194 To 
comply with the Act, the sender could show express consent in 
the form of direct authorization, or implied consent through 
prior dealings or an existing business relationship.195 
Such a modified provision would further reduce cost-shift-
ing and would more easily withstand constitutional challenges 
under the less stringent Ward test. 196 Presently, all the other 
TCPA prohibitions are content-neutral. 197 Expanding the pro-
190. Andy Pargh, Some Facts About Fax Machines, THE STATE JOURNAL REGIS-
TER (Springfield, Ill.), Aug. 4, 1995, at 4A. Such technology also pennits a user to 
send and receive a fax simultaneously or to receive multiple incoming transmis-
sions at once. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. See generally Andrea Gerlin, Business Tired of Faxed Ads Sue the Senders, 
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 9, 1995, at Bl. 
193. Jim Doyle, Court Upholds Junk-Fax Ban, THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 
Feb. 2, 1995, at A17. 
194. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring the "prior express 
invitation or permission" of the recipient). 
195. See generally id. (Routine faxes between businesses or individuals would 
still be protected since prior dealings could imply consent. Implied consent might 
also be shown through business or professional relationships, or through prior acts 
such as providing someone with the facsimile machine phone number.). See also 
Daniel Brenner, Federal Court Decision: a Roadblock to Advertising on the Infor-
mation Highway?, 5 WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION (LEGAL OPINION LETTER) NO. 
12 (June 9, 1995). 
196. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
197. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(l) (Supp. V 1993). The TCPA prohibits using an 
automatic dialing system to deliver a message, regardless of its content. The law 
similarly precludes sending unsolicited messages to residential phones or simulta-
neously engaging more than one phone line in a multi-line business system. Id. 
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vision to proscribe unsolicited faxes regardless of their content 
would give the courts an easier, more consistent test of consti-
tutionality. 
B. THE TCPA SHOULD RESTRICT UNSOLICITED ADVERTISING 
ON THE INTERNET 
Recently, advertisers have begun to exploit the 
Internee98 by soliciting their products and services in a prac-
tice commonly known as "spamming.,,199 Some advertisers 
send unsolicited electronic mail (hereinafter "e-mail") to indi-
viduals or large groups of user mailboxes.2oo More frequently, 
advertisers post sales messages in newsgroups, which are 
Internet "sites" containing articles, messages, and e-mails 
about a specific topic.201 Spammers argue that these legiti-
mate sales tactics are no different than telemarketing calls and 
mass mailings.202 However, considering the cost of on-line 
time, information experts agree that the TCPA should be ex-
panded to protect Internet users from receiving unsolicited 
information.203 As with faxes, Internet messages are inexpen-
sive and easy to send.204 They are also difficult for the typical 
on-line user to avoid.205 Individuals encountering junk e-mail 
must sort through obscurely titled postings to ascertain the 
value of each message.206 Junk e-mail can be avoided through 
198. See supra note 12. 
199. See John Schwartz, It's the Spam You Read That's Making Many 
Interneters Queasy, THE WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 20, 1995, at F17 (hereinafter 
·SCHWARTZ"). See L. CANTER AND M. SIEGEL, How TO MAKE A FORTUNE ON THE 
INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY: EVERYONE'S GUERILLA GUIDE TO MARKETING ON THE 
INTERNET AND OTHER ON-LINE SERVICES (HarperCollins 1994). 
200. See SCHWARTZ. One advertiser sent an e-mail advertisement to 171,000 
people and listed a false return address. Small circulations are uncommon since 
they are too difficult, expensive, and time consuming. Id. 
201. Understand the Culture, THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, Aug. 14, 1994, at D3. 
Over 8,000 newsgroups exist on the Internet ranging from a bonsai aficionados 
group to a Somalia discussion group. Id. 
202. See SCHWARTZ. 
203. See Kit R. Roane, Court Upholds Law Banning Unsolicited Fax Ads, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1995, at B6. See also Grant Parsons, And Now For a Word 
From . .. , THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 30, 1995, at E1 (Unso-
licited advertising on the Internet may soon be illegal because of cost-shifting to 
subscribers if recent court decisions prohibiting unsolicited faxes are any guide.). 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. See id. See also Daniel Ansk, Postcard from Cyberspace, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
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prescreening or specialized software, but much like fax adver-
tising and telemarketing, this shifts the cost and inconvenience 
onto the unwilling consumer.207 Although most servers do at-
tempt to pre-screen commercial messages,208 advertisers are 
increasingly finding their way into user mailboxes and discus-
sion areas. As a result, consumer awareness and unrest toward 
on-line advertising has grown considerably since 1994.209 
In response to this widespread consumer discontent, TCPA 
subsection (b)(1)(C) should be expanded to restrict unsolicited 
Internet advertising.210 Presently, this provision prohibits 
sending "unsolicited advertisements" by fax or computer, but 
only to other facsimile machines.2l1 As a result, on-line adver-
tising remains unregulated.212 Congress should examine the 
I, 1995, at 4 (Some users report receiving up to several hundred unsolicited ad 
postings each day.). 
207. See Junk Mail Threatens to Clog E-mail Boxes, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Aug. 
14, 1995, at C3. Commercial and even free e-mail "filter" programs are available 
to help users sift through unwanted mail. These programs automatically delete 
messages which contain names, profanities, or other selected words. Id. See also 
Tim Blangger, AM. Magazine Online, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Aug. 8, 1995, at 
Dl. 
208. See Bruce V. Bigelow, Infuriated Client Sues Over Junk E-mail, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 19, 1995, at HI-2. CompuServe prohibits sending advertising 
solicitations to its subscribers. However, some Internet servers, like Prodigy Ser-
vices, Co., permit on-line advertising in an effort to defray subscription costs_ Us-
ers of these servers have already consented to such solicitations through prior 
registration and consent forms. Id. 
Server and individual newsgroup operators attempt to intercept incoming 
unsolicited ads before they are delivered to the users. However, operators are not 
on guard 24 hours a day, and ads frequently slip through. See generally Daniel 
Akst, Postcard From Cyberspace, L.A. TIMES, Nov. I, 1995, at 4. 
209. See Tim Blangger, AM. Magazine Online, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, 
Aug. 8, 1995, at D1. In April, 1994, a husband/wife law firm transmitted a mes-
sage advertising their immigration legal services to thousands of Internet users 
worldwide. In response, so many recipients flooded their mail server with negative 
messages that it malfunctioned. Following this now infamous incident, server ad-
ministrators began creating more structured rules to define acceptable solicitations. 
However, spamming is still viewed as an unacceptable Internet practice by most 
users. Id. See Stephen McGookin, FT Review of Business Books, THE FINANCIAL 
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1995. See also L. CANTER AND M. SIEGEL, How TO MAKE A FOR-
TUNE ON THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY: EVERYONE'S GUERILLA GUIDE TO MAR-
KETING ON THE INTERNET AND OTHER ON-LINE SERVICES (HarperCollins 1994). 
210. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1993). 
211. Id. 
212. See id. Recent attempts to curtail other Internet infractions has had only a 
limited effect. In November, 1995, the United States Department of Transportation 
fined Virgin Airways for placing a misleading advertisement on the Internet. See 
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prevalence and harms of unsolicited on-line messages, and 
modify current TCPA statutory language to restrict this prac-
tice.213 The on-line costs to users caused by such messages 
are real and can only be curbed through federal interven-
tion.214 
By no means, however, should all forms of advertising be 
banned from the Internet.215 Only advertising which is unso-
licited or "pushed onto the consumer" should be restricted.216 
Many individuals enjoy browsing though "Internet malls" or 
classified advertisement groups searching for possible purchas-
es.217 However, access to this sort of information is complete-
ly under the user's control. 218 Like magazine advertisement 
or junk mail, users can skim messages or ignore them com-
pletely.219 A slight modification in TCPA language would al-
low advertisement "links" or "sites" where information can be 
also Rhonda Richards, Virgin Airways Fined $14,000 for 'Net Ad, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 22, 1995, at B2. Other government agencies continue to seek ways to curb 
on-line copyright, trademark and pornography infractions. [d. 
213. See generally Moser v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 970, 974-75 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995). Only through Congressional analysis can the threat 
of unsolicited on-line messages be determined. If Congress finds that both commer-
cial and non-commercial on-line messages equally injure the unwilling recipient, 
then the current content based language of TCPA subsection (b)(1)(C) should be 
amended. See supra notes 180-97 and related text. 
214. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993). Internet users frequently com-
municate interstate, suggesting that Congress has the authority to enact such 
legislation through its commerce power. See also 47 U.S.C. § 227(0(2) (Supp. V 
1993). 
215. See Stephen McGookin, FT Review of Business Books, THE FINANCIAL 
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1995 (Some newsgroups are dedicated specifically for commercial 
advertiSing and usually include the word "biz" in the newsgroup's name.). See also 
Tim Blangger, A.M. Magazine Online, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Aug. 8, 1995, at 
Dl. 
216. [d. 
217. [d. See Grant Parsons, And Now For a Word From . .. , THE NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 30, 1995, at El. Many companies maintain on-line 
"websites" where Internet users can access information about their products. Com-
panies such as Pizza Hut and Federal Express currently operate such websites or 
homepages where users can purchase goods and services on-line. [d. 
218. See id. (Frequently, this is accomplished by choosing certain options or 
"clicking" certain buttons on the computer screen to call up messages or other 
information. ). 
219. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (The Court 
struck down a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited advertisements 
for contraceptives. The Court held that a "short, though regular, journey from the 
mailbox to the trashcan . . . is an acceptable burden, at least as far as the Con-
stitution is concerned."). 
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"pulled off," but would restrict advertisers from using e-mail or 
newsgroups to push their wares without prior consent.220 
New technological and communication advances emerge 
each year. As a result, Congress must survey and evaluate the 
communications field regularly to accommodate for new con-
sumer threats. That way, the Internet and other communica-
tion avenues can continue to be regulated in an "efficient, 
effective, and economic manner" to protect user privacy and 
prevent advertising cost-shifting.221 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although the Ninth Circuit properly upheld the TCPA in 
both Destination Ventures and Moser, it failed to thoroughly 
analyze these provisions under their corresponding commercial 
speech tests.222 The court was also unable to consider the 
challenged statutory subsections in light of current technolo-
gies.223 As a result, the court was forced to accept cost-shift-
ing statistics and consumer opinion already four years out of 
date.224 Congress must amend and continually update the 
TCPA so that federal courts may address constitutional chal-
lenges using current information. 
Michael D. McConathy· 
220. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1993). 
221. [d. at § 227(c)(2) (Supp. V 1993) (describing how the F.C.C. should pre-
scribe regulations and procedures under the TCPA). 
222. See Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995); Moser 
v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995). 
223. See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d 57. 
224. See id. See also Moser, 46 F.3d 970. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1997. I would like to 
thank Caren Jenkins, Jennifer Wohlstadter, Marilyn Weinstein, and Prof. Michael 
DeVito for their advice and editorial suggestions. I also thank my family and 
Debbie Taquechel for their continued understanding and support. 
30
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss1/11
